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Globale Mindestbesteuerung und Gewinnverlagerung: Eine empirische Analyse auf Basis von Country-by-Country-Reporting-Daten
Global Minimum Taxation and Profit Shifting: An Empirical Analysis Based on Country-by-Country Reporting Data
This contribution utilizes anonymized, aggregated OECD Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR) data for multinational enterprise (MNE) groups headquartered in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland to examine the association between effective tax rates (ETRs) and potential base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) practices. The authors construct BEPS indicators from financial ratios and a “misaligned profit” measure that compares reported profits with substance-based profit allocations based on employees, tangible assets, and revenues in MNE jurisdictions, analyze correlations between the ratios, and perform a logistic regression. Results show that very low ETRs are systematically associated with “excess” profits, while higher ETRs generally correlate with “missing” profits. The results are robust for Germany and Switzerland, with Austria limited by coarser aggregation. The findings suggest that the worldwide implementation of a 15 % global minimum tax for MNE groups could meaningfully reduce BEPS incentives, subject to data and methodological limitations.
I. Überblick
In der wissenschaftlichen Literatur wurde das Phänomen der Gewinnverkürzung und ‑verlagerung (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting; BEPS) multinationaler Unternehmensgruppen bereits umfassend untersucht. Betrachtet wurden sowohl die unterschiedlichen Kanäle, über die BEPS realisiert wird,